STREETS AS BOUNDARIES IN PENNSYLVANIA.
The question as to whether a grantee in a deed calling
for a street or highway as a boundary takes title to the
middle of the street or whether he is limited to the side
thereof has prodiced an unusually large number of cases
in Pennsylvania. This is due chiefly to the fact, as pointed
out by the late Mr. Justice Dean, that the two earliest
decisions of importance on the subject were decided each
on its facts, which, while different, were so closely related that both bench and bar became involved in an
uncertainty as to what was the rule and what were the
exceptions. The law is now well settled on the main
point that where a grant is made of land abutting on
an open street the grantee takes title to the middle of
the street unless the fee of the street bed is reserved
to the grantor by express language of the deed. This
was decided in the leading case of Paul v. Carver, 26
Pa. St. 224 (1856) and has been uniformly followed.
But while it is easy enough to thus state the general
proposition, there still remain many collateral questions
to which the answer has not been so clearly indicated.
For instance, does the rule above stated apply also to
plotted but unopened streets? Under what circumstances does reference in a deed to an unopened street
amount to a dedication thereof? Who is entitled to
damages upon the opening of such a street, and to
whom does the fee revert if it is never opened, but
instead is vacated? To review the cases on these and
related questions is the sole excuse for the writing of
this article, which from the necessarily generic nature of
the title might seem to be entirely superfluous.
For convenience of treatment the cases are classed
under three heads, though there is naturally considerable
overlapping. But in general the questions have arisen
in the three following ways: (i) In an action of ejectment between the grantor and grantee upon the vacation of a street. (2) In an action of covenant or trespass
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by the grantee against the grantor for interference with
alleged rights. (3) In an action for damages against the
municipality upon the opening of a street, either grantor
or grantee being plaintiff.
I.

ACTIONS

OF EJECTMENT.

These necessarily involve the question of the title to
the bed of the street. The first case in which the matter
squarely arose was Union Burial Ground v. Robinson,
5 Wharton i8 (1839). The deed to Robinson, the plaintiff below, called for Washington Street as a boundary
"as the same may hereafter be opened." The street
had been previously plotted and recorded but was then
unopened and was later vacated. The Court, per Kennedy, J., held (I) that there was a presumption that the
grantee's title went to the middle, which presumption
was met and rebutted in this case by the nicety with
which the distances were calculated to the side, and (2)
that "had the street here been laid out and dedicated
to public use * * * possibly a different question
might have been involved."
While to-day the mere
exactness in bringing the feet and inches of a deed to
the side of the street is not sufficient to limit the title
there,* the distinction between an opened and an unopened street made in the second portion of the opinion
is supported by several later cases.
Thus in Bellinger v. Union Burial Ground, io Pa. St.
135 (1848), it was held, in an action of covenant on the
same facts as the Robinson case, that there was no covenant by the grantor that the City would open the street,
and on vacation of it the grantor took possession of the
bed. Such possession could only be based on the assumption that he had not passed title to it to the grantee.
*But in Neely v. Phila.212 Pa. St. 551, (r9o5) the deed called for the
side of an unopened street as the southern boundary and for the middle
of an open street as the northern boundary. Held that title went only
to side. This is in line with Union Burial Ground v. Robinson as to
grantor retaining title to unopened street, but the Court also relies on
the fact that the measurements brought it to the side only and also
that for the southern boundary the word "side" was used and for the
northern the word "middle."
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The distinction thus made in the Robinson case was
further strengthened by the reference to it in both Paul
v. Carver, 26 Pa. St. 224 (1856) and Cox v. Freedly,
33 Pa. St. 124 (1859) and apparently it would be the law
of Pennsylvania to-day if it were not for a decision to
be mentioned presently. In Paul v. Carver the ejectment was for the bed of a street open and in use at the
time of the deed, and the Court in referring to the earlier
case distinguished it from the case at bar by saying"the Court (in the Robinson case) carefully stated that the case of
a lot bounded on a street laid out and dedicated to public use at the
time of the grant would present a ilifferent question. The case is
therefore no precedent for one like the present."

And in Cox v. Freedly on facts similar to Paul v.
Carver, the Court refers to what it terms "the doctrine"
of Union Burial Ground v. Robinson by saying that it
is not to be applied to streets actually opened and used
by the public. In Speckman v. Steidel 88 Pa. St. 453
(1879) the Court says"where the street called for as a boundary is not a public highway,
nor dedicated to public use, the grantee does not take title in fee to
the centre of it, but by implication acquires an easement or right of
way only over the land."

In the case of Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co., 6
Wharton 25 (1840) Chief Justice Gibson said:
"In The Union Burial Ground Company v. Robinson, s Wharton
x8, in which the point was elaborately argued, the contest was
betwixt the grantor and a purchaser from the grantee; and though
the cause was eventually decided on another ground, the Court
inclined to think, on the authority of many decisions, that the title
to the street, even had it been opened, would have remained in the
grantor; and such appears to be the principle of Kirkham v. Sharp,
x Wharton 323."

Kirkham v. Sharp was a case as to the extent an easement of way could be used. The decision in Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co. was never followed.
Moreover the only standing which a grantor of land
on such an unopened street can have to claim damages
when the street is later opened is that he is still the owner
of the bed of the street. This is admitted by the cases
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on this point discussed infra and it is sufficient to refer
here to In re Brooklyn Street, 118 Pa. St. 64o (1887),
in which the grantor of land on an unopened street was
awarded damages for the bed of the street when taken
by the City on opening. This could only be on the theory
that he had retained title thereto, his deed not being
under the facts a dedication, (when reference in a deed
to a "paper" street is or is not a dedication is discussed
infra,) and not being a conveyance of the street bed.
The only ground for its not being a conveyance of the
bed is the doctrine of the Robinson case.
But this line of cases and the Robinson case on which
they rest must fall if the decision in Dobson v. Hohenadel,
148 Pa. St. 367 (1892), is the law. The facts were that
the plaintiffs sold a lot to the defendant. The deed, plaintiff's plan which was referred to in the deed, and the City
plan, all showed that the lot was bounded on the southwest by a railroad. The City plan showed a street of
one hundred and twenty feet called "The Philadelphia
& Norristown Railroad." The Railroad actually occupied
sixty-six feet in the center, leaving a space of twentyseven feet on either side. This street was plotted but
never formally opened. Later the City abandoned the
street and defendant advanced his building and fences
so as to enclose the twenty-seven feet. The grantors
brought an action on a case stated to determine the
title to the strip.
It was held that as the grantors sold the lot to defendant by a plan which showed it to be upon a street,
the conveyance was a dedication of the land covered by
the plotted street, and that they retained no title to it;
that the grantee took title to the middle of the street,
subject, it is true, to the rights of the railroad, the City
and the adjoining lot- owners, but that as between the
grantors and the grantee, the former had no standing
to maintain an action.*
*Fallsv. Reis 74 Pa. St. 439 (1873) is an earlier decision in line with
Dobson v. Hohenadel. .There a testator devised land bounded by an
unopened street and in ejectment by a devisee it was held that the
latter took title to the middle of the bed.
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It is true, under the decisions, that where a lot is conveyed according to a plan which shows it to be on a street,
there is a dedication and a covenant enforceable against
the grantor for free egress and ingress. And where such
street is later opened the grantor is not entitled to damages. But this is so only where the grantor first so created
the paper street, and not where he simply, in his deed,
refers to a street already plotted on the City plan. This
distinction was acted on in the opening of Brooklyn
Street. And that a reference in a deed to such a street
is not a covenant by the grantor that the street will be
opened, was early decided in the Bellinger case. That
being the case, should the grantor be in any worse position because he not only refers in his deed to such cityplotted street, but also refers to a plan showing such
street? The facts in Dobson v. Hohenadel show that
the City first plotted the street, and that the grantors
simply adopted the City plan as their own. They refer
to the street in their plan, and make the plan part of
their deed, but by doing so, do they estop themselves
any more than the grantors in the Bellinger and
Brooklyn cases did? The Court in the Brooklyn case
expressly declares that a distinction exists in the effect
of words of description in a private grant where the adjoining street is laid out by public authority and where
by act of the owner. Truly the additional description
in the plan can be of no greater importance than the
language of the deed, for while it is made a part of the
deed, it is not superior to it. Therefore the grantors in
Dobson v. Hohenadel when they referred to the railroad
street in plan and deed were doing no more than the
grantors in the Bellinger and Brooklyn cases did, for in
all three cases the reference was to a street previously
plotted by the City. And if the doctrine is sound that
reference to a previously plotted street is no covenant
that the public authorities will later open it, it ought not
to be a dedication. In fact in the Bellinger case the
grantors (who were the defendants, it being an action of
covenant) did sell by a plan which showed the street
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already plotted by the City. That case therefore squarely
decides that there is no covenant by the grantor that
the street will be kept open to be implied from the use in
plan and deed of descriptive words referring to such street,
and that, upon vacation of the street, the grantor may
enter upon the bed of the street. The facts are exactly
similar in the Dobson case, the Court itself saying"In laying out the lots for the plaintiff, Mr. L. recognized and
adopted the line of the street as it appearedat the time on the city

plan."

It is therefore submitted that the decision in the Dobson
case is inconsistent with both the Bellinger and Brooklyn
cases, neither of which are referred to in the opinion,
and a fortiori it is contrary to Union Burial Ground v.
Robinson. Indeed Mr. Justice Williams' language completely erases the doctrine of these cases when he
broadly says in the course of the opinion"We fully agree with the position of the appellee that the deed
from the plaintiffs to him was in its legal operation a deed to the
center of the street. * * * It is no matter that the street had
not been opened according to law by the City."

If this is to be followed the distinction between opened
and unopened streets is swept away, and in all cases
the grantee's title will go to the middle. It is conceded
that such a result is desirable and will tend to uniformity and clearness, but it does not tend to clearness
to have cases overruled and doctrines overthrown without the slightest reference being made to them by the
later cases.*
In passing, reference may be made to several corollaries resulting from Paul v. Carver. Thus, where land
is sold at a certain price per acre, the bed of a boundary
street is to be included in the acreage in estimating the
purchase price. Timstone v. Sparte, 150 Pa. St. 616
(1892).
It is also possible to limit the grantee's title
*YetinNeelyv.Phila.212 Pa. St. 55', (19o5) the Court says that on
an open street the grantor takes fee to middle, while on a plotted but
unopened one "grantor takes the fee in the land bounded by the street
and by implication acquires an easement over the bed."
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to the side, though to do so the conveyancer must bear
in mind the description in Cox v. Freedly and leave no
stone unturned to make certain the reservation of the
street bed. Thus an intention to so retain may be seen
from the grant of a right of way to the grantee over the
street by the same conveyance. Hobson v. Philadelphia,
150 Pa. St. 595 (1892). But in general as is said by Mr.
Justice Dean in Fitzell v. Philadelphia, 211 Pa. St. i
(1905), to limit the boundary to the side
"There must be an express reservation, or the lines must be stopped
short of the middle of the street or highway by a permanent natural
or artificial monument."
II.

CASES IN COVENANT

OR TRESPASS.

While the practical working out of the decision in the
Bellinger case, viz., that the grantor became possessed
of the vacated street bed, may be assumed to be now
reversed since the result of the Dobson case was exactly
the opposite, yet the Bellinger case is still authority for
the proposition that where a grantor refers to a street
plotted but unopened he does not thereby covenant that
the municipality will later'open the street, for the evident reason that he cannot so bind the public authorities.
But where a grantor refers to a street which he himself
lays out he does covenant, wholly apart from the question
of the fee, that the grantee shall have a right of way
over the street. Thus in Trutt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. St. 339
(1878), the defendant sold a lot bounded by streets
described in a plan of a large tract of which the lot was
a part. Failing to sell the balance of the tract, he enclosed it with a fence, thereby depriving plaintiff of any
egress. The Court properly held that the case was unlike the Bellinger case, and that the reference in the
plan and deed to the streets was not merely descriptive
but a covenant as to the existence of the streets. To
the same effect is Transue v. Sell, 1o5 Pa. St. 604 (x884).
But that the right that the grantee thus obtains is not
the fee to the bed, but an easement of way, is shown by
Speckman v. Steidel, 88 Pa. St. 453 (1879), an action
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of trespass for obstruction to an alleged right of way.
Both plaintiffs and defendant took title from the same
grantor. The plaintiffs' deed called for the western
boundary along a " 2 o -feet-wide street." This street was
never plotted or opened, and existed only in the description in the deed, and was in effect a "blind alley." The
plaintiffs' title from the common grantor yeas more than
twenty-one years old prior to suit, and no use had ever
been made by the plaintiffs or their predecessor in title
of the alley. Mercur, J. held that"the complaint of the defendants in error is not for the disturbance
of an easement once enjoyed, but substantially to recover in an
action ex delicto for damages to a right based on an implied covenant, of which they never had any possession. After this great lapse
of time we think the present action cannot be sustained;"

This decision was manifestly on the ground that the
twenty-foot street was never a public highway, and
hence, as stated in the opinion, the grantee did not take
title to the center, but took only an easement which
was gone after twenty-one years and more of abandonment.
Bliem v. Daubenspeck, 169 Pa. St. 282 (1895), greatly
restricts the- doctrine of the Bellinger case. One R.
owned certain land through which an alley was projected
and plotted in 1870. In 1871 he sold a portion of the
land, situate on the east side of the alley, to.plaintiff's
predecessor, describing the line of the alley as the western
line. The alley was never formally opened, though it
was used by the abutting owners as a way, their fences
being built on the line, and in 1887 it was vacated by
the municipality. The grantor then sold his rights in
the bed to defendants, who proceeded to build on it.
Plaintiff brought trespass. The case was treated as if
the alley had been formally opened, and plaintiff recovered
on the basis of Paul v. Carver. While it is true that the
deed in the Bellinger case described the street "as the
same shall be opened," yet in Bliem v. Daubenspeck
the street was not formally opened. The Court, however,
chose to greatly narrow the scope of the decision in the
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earlier case, and in doing so laid down the rule that the
intention of the-grantor in describing plaintiff's western
line as on the alley was to give them title to the middle,
in the absence of a reservation of it to himself. This is
the rule of Paul v. Carveras to an opened street, and the
Court here extends it to an alley which was in actual
use though never formally opened,--on the same principles as controlled the Court in deciding Paul v. Carver.
It therefore follows that on vacation of a street the grantee
takes to the middle where (I) the street had been formally
opened and in actual use as such, where (2) the street
has never been formally opened but was in actual use;
and the grantor retains title only where (3) the street
was never formally opened and in fact never used, on
the authority of the Robinson and Bellinger cases, to
which the later ease of Dobson v. Hohenadel is contrary.
But the dictum in the recent Neely case supports the
earlier decisions.
III.,

CASES AS TO DAMAGES

ON OPENING.

Where one sells land and the deed describes the lot
as bounded by certain streets which are wholly the creation of the deed, or where a plan showing such streets
accompanies the deed, it is not only a covenant that the
grantee shall have a way over such streets but it is also
a dedication of the bed of such streets to the use of the
public. And when later such streets are formally opened
the grantor is not entitled to any damages, as his dedication was, as is said in some of the cases, in effect a contract with the public. This point is decided in a per
curiam opinion in In re Pearl Street, III Pa. St. 565
(1886), affirming an opinion by the present Chief Justice,
then in the court below, and has been uniformly followed.
Where, however, there is no other evidence of dedication
than the mere fact of public user, the right is purely
prescriptive, and an uninterrupted adverse use for twentyone years must be shown. Weiss v. Borough of South
Bethlehem, 136 Pa. St. 294 (1890).
And a grantor is not estopped from claiming damages
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on opening because a predecessor in title sold land on
another block of the street before it was plotted by a
deed calling for the line of said street. Easton v. Rinek,
116 Pa. St. i (1887). Of this case it is said in Scranton
v. Thomas, 141 Pa. St. 4, (1891)"The single sale of a lot or lots in the same block might be evidence
of the dedication of the street in that particular block, but not of the
dedication of such street to the whole extent of the plot."

This estoppel or "contract with the public," would of
course remain a permanent bar were it not for the Act
of May 9 th, 1889 (P. L. 173), which provides that any
street, etc., laid out by any person in any village or town
plan, which has not been opened to or used by the public
within twenty-one years, shall be of no effect. By this
Act the servitude imposed is removed if not acted on
within twenty-one years. In Quicksall v. Philadelphia,
177 Pa. St. 301 (1896), the act was held to coverthecase
of a dedication by reference in deed or plan of the grantor, where the street was never used as such and never
formally opened. This is followed in Woodward v.
Pittsburg, 194 Pa. St. 193 (1899), and in Cotter v. Philadelphia id. 496. These decisions cover only the point
that the servitude is removed by the statute, and do not
affect, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Fell,"the right of those who by purchase of lots within the tract have
acquired the right of the use of all the streets marked on the plan."

This question arose in Barner v. Railroad Company,
In that case the plaintiff's
Super. Ct. 84 (1905).
predecessor had bought land from one Young, the deed
calling for a certain street as the western boundary.
This street existed only by force of such deed, which
therefore, under the authorities, was a dedication of it
to the use of the grantee and the public at large. Being
technically unopened, however, the fee remained in the
grantor. The street never had any other existence, and
more than twenty-one years after the plaintiff brought
ejectment. It was held, in giving judgment for the
27
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defendant, that plaintiff's rights were limited to the
covenant arising from the language of the deed, and that
the Act of 1889 was not applicable, as the reference in
the deed was not a "town plot or plan of lots." It is
to be observed that this is a stricter construction of the
statute than is had in either the Quicksall or Woodward
cases, supra, for in neither of those cases was the plan
a "town plan," but simply that of the original owner
of the tract. Evidently if the remedial statute is to
apply only to streets actually placed on a "town plan"
its effect is greatly narrowed, yet such is the language
of the act. It was ingeniously argued for the plaintiff
that the effect of the Act of 1889 was to vacate the street
by operation of law and that the title reverted to the
plaintiff as abutting owner. The Court replied that,
even assuming that the act applied, which it denied,
as pointed out above,-it did not ipso facto vacate the
street, but merely removed the servitude on the land
if after twenty-one years it was not opened as a street.
The same result could have been reached on the short
reasoning that as the grantor had not parted with the
fee of the "paper" street at the beginning, and as nothing
had occurred since to change the rights of the parties,
the grantee could not maintain ejectment. The running commentary of the Court in the first part of the
opinion is unnecessary to the decision and wholly confusing.
It is a dedication, as discussed supra, only where the
grantor is the creator of the street. A different problem
is presented where the grantor refers as a boundary to
a street already laid out by the public authorities through
his land but not opened to public use. On such facts
it is held that he has not thereby waived his right to
damages; Opening of Brooklyn Street, i18 Pa. St. 640
(i888). In his opinion Mr. Justice Green points out the
difference between this and In re Pearl Street, and cites
the Bellinger case to show that there, in an action of
covenant, the same distinction between actual private
dedication and simply a reference to a street already
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plotted by the public is recognized and acted on. It is
to be borne in mind that the question in these cases is
not one between grantor and grantee, but between the
grantor and the public. Where the grantor dedicates
the land he of course dedicates it to the public, but as
said in the decision"when a municipal government lays out streets upon the land of a
private citizen it is not the act of the owner in any sense, and hence
there is no necessity for an implication of a covenant against the
owner to give his land to the public without compensation."

And as to his reference to such street in his deed,
"the public is not in privity with him; his dealing is
not with them but with a private citizen." This case
is followed in Opening of Wayne Street, 124 Pa. St. 135
(1889).
A curious illustration of the doctrine, first expressed
in the Bellinger case, that reference by the grantor to
a plotted street is no covenant by him that the municipality will open the street, occurred in Fitzell v. Philadelphia, 211 Pa. St. 1, (1905).

There, the grantors sold

land abutting on a street fifty feet wide, which at that
time was plotted to sixty feet. They retained adjoining
land on the same street, and when it was widened, they
claimed damages for the ten feet taken along the front
of the portion retained by them. The referee held that
by deeding land on the street when plotted to sixty feet,
they gave a right of way to their grantees of that width
over the street, including the portion retained and that,
therefore, they were not entitled to damages.
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Dean held that
no such right could be implied. The plotting of the street
by the City implied no covenant by a grantor, for the
single reason, stated by the learned Justice, that it is
beyond the power of a grantor to so covenant.
While Brooklyn Street decides that a grantor who refers
in his deed or plan to an unopened street, already plotted by the municipality, does not thereby surrender the
fee to the bed of such street, neither it nor a similar
case, Whitaker v. Phownixville, 14I Pa. St. 327 (i891),
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decides what the measure of damages is to such grantor
when the street is actually opened.
The latter case, however, does decide that the time
when damages are to be ascertained, under the Act of
April 22, 1856, P. L. 525, is when the street is opened,
and not when it is first established, as was the case under
the Act of 1855 (see Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Pa.
St. 24).

Hence, what the grantor did with other contiguous
land at some prior time is immaterial. Thus in Whitaker
v. Phrnixville, the grantor owned lots i, 2 and 3. Lot
i was plotted as a prospective street, and he later sold
Lot 2 at an increased price as a comer property. When
the street was subsequently opened, and the question of
his damages for the bed arose, it was held that the amount
was not to be affected by any advantage he had gained
by selling Lot 2 at an increased price. The question
as to the effect on the nature of the retained street bed
of the fact that he sold the adjoining property as abutting on said street is only intimated in the case. This
important fact, as bearing on the amount of damages,
is first decided in Gamble v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. St.
413 (1894).

There the street was first plotted by the

City and then referred to by the grantor. Such reference
undoubtedly gave the grantees a right of way over it,
and hence when opened, the amount of damages was
affected by such right, the use to which the grantor
could put the land being thereby greatly curtailed. The
Court below left the question to the jury, carefully explaining that the land was, before opening, subject to
such easement, and also to the right of the City to open
the street. The jury found that. the resulting value
was nothing. In the language of the affirming opinion
"the Court did leave to the jury to say what was the plaintiW's land
worth in view oWall the circumstances, and the jury said it was worth
nothing."

Side by side -with those cases announcing the right
of the grantor of land on an unopened street to receive
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damages when the street is later opened, there exists a
line of cases holding that the grantee has a similar right,
on the theory that whatever right the grantor may have
in the unopened bed disappears the moment the street
is opened, eo instanti the fee of the grantee "jumps"
to the center, and he is entitled to damages.
In Lehigh Street, 81* Pa. St. 85 (1872) the doctrine of
"jumping" is first mentioned. In that case when the
grantees took title Lehigh Street was surveyed but not
opened. Later when opened by the town council of
Easton, the grantees claimed damages. The lower Court
in dismissing exceptions to a report of viewers awarding
substantial damages to the grantees held that as soon
as Lehigh Street was publicly opened eo instanti the
grantees took a fee to the center of the street. The Court
granted that under Union Burial Ground v. Robinson
the grantor has some sort of a reversion, to the street
bed as long as the stfeet is unopened, but the moment
it is opened the reversion disappears, the title of grantees
jumps to the center, and a right of damages is in them.
" The incontrovertible fact is that the opening of street for public
use, the right of action for damages, and the vesting of a fee in the
petitioners to the center of the street, are simultaneous acts."

This was affirmed in what was practically a per curiam.
Lehigh Street is followed in Hancock v Phiadelpkia,
175 Pa. St. 124 (1896), where the Court below pointedly
remarks that as no part of plaintiff's ground was taken
for the opening, it is not a little difficult to see how
plaintiff was injured, for, on the contrary, it was only
by the opening that plaintiff took title to the middle.
However, the question was left to the jury, which properly
brought in a verdict for the defendant. This was affirmed
in a per curiam.
It is unfortunate that this further confusion has crept
into the Pennsylvania law on this subject. Assuming
the doctrine to be settled that on an unopened street
the grantee's title goes only to the side, and that on
opening it jumps to the middle, it by no means follows
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that the grantee thereby becomes entitled to damages.
It is certainly generous measure to hold that by the
opening the grantor loses title to the road bed and therefore gets damages and that by the same act the grantee
gets the title so lost and therefore gets damages. The
value to the grantor is naturally restricted by the rights
of the public and by his covenant to the grantee of a
right of way, but how can the grantee get any value of
land which until the opening was not his? The jury in
Hancock v. Philadelphia very properly found that the
grantee had sustained no damages, but it is an anomaly
to send it to the jury at all.*
If it is the law that the grantee takes title to the middle
in all cases, then the decision In re Brooklyn Street is
wrong. Both lines of decisions cannot be right. The
only justification of such an illogical result is the maximnot legal-that it is a poor rule that does not work both
ways.
What has been said in this article apparently in favor
of the rule of Union Burial Ground v. R6binson has been
advanced arguendo, simply to illustrate how that case
has been recognized here, over-looked there, acted on
in one line of decisions and disregarded in another.
It is submitted that Union Burial Ground v. Robinson
should be reversed or considered as overruled, and that
the doctrine of Paul v. Carver should apply in all cases,
whether the street is opened or unopened. The result
would be that title to the bed vests immediately in the
grantee. If the street is later officially opened he is
entitled to damages. If it is never opened or is opened
*In Cole v. Philadelphia,199 Pa. St. 464 (r901) on facts similar to
the Hancock v. Philadelphiacase the jury found that Aaintiff had
suffered no damage. The case is curious for the reason that the grantee
built a fence to the middle of an unopened street, and maintained it
there for over twenty-one years until the street was formally opened.
On this ground he claimed adverse title against the grantor, but the
Court held, -per Mr. Justice Potter, that building a fence to the middle
was not sufficient to break the privity existing between the grantor
and the grantee. As the grantor owned the bed it is difficult to conceive of a more unequivocal and notorious way of claiming adverse
title to it than to build a fence around it.
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and later vacated his fee is released from the public
servitude. In all cases the grantor's whole title and
interest ends at the time of the conveyance. All the
questions above considered would thus be reduced to
an easy solution. Such a result is desirable on the
ground of simplicity and is fully justifiable on principle.
Boyd Lee Spahr.

